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RUSSIA'S POSITION TOWARD OTTOMAN
ORTHODOX CHRISTIANS
AN 1816 INSTRUCTION FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

Theophilus C. Prousis
Documents on tsarist policy in the Near East offer suggestive
detail, subtle nuance, and firsthand commentary on the proposed
if not actual state of Russo-Ottoman affairs regarding specific
issues between the two neighboring autocratic empires. These features, to varying degrees, are manifested in this translated directive
ofJune 1816, from Foreign Minister Karl V. Nessel'rode to envoy
Grigorii A. Stroganov in Istanbul, dealing with Russia's attitude
toward the sultan's Eastern Orthodox subjects in the aftermath of
the Congress of Vienna. The Foreign Ministry's instruction merits
attention by scholars oflmperial Russia's involvement in the Eastern Question as a reminder that primary sources on particular
aspects of the Russo-Ottoman nexus warrant closer scrutiny and
critical commentary.
The Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI)
holds extensive records for the study of Russia's contacts and connections with the far-flung regions of the Ottoman Empire. 1 The
Foreign Ministry dispatch presented here provides but one example of
the wealth and variety of AVPRI records, published and unpublished,
I For an introduction to AVPRI's rich resources, see the archival guide of I. V.
Budnik, ed., Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi fmperii: Putevoditel' (Minneapolis:
East View Publications, Inc., 1995). Because Western scholars have had full access
to this institution only since 1990, identifying some of the actual collections provides a useful research rool for specialists in the field. For a sampling of AVPRI holdings on tsarist interests in the Near East, see Theophilus C. Prousis, "AVPR (Arkhiv
Vneshnei Politiki Rossii) and the Orthodox East," Modern Greek Studies Yearbook
12/13 (I 996-97): 473-503, and idem, "A Guide to AVPRI Materials on Russian
Consuls and Commerce in the Near East," Modern Greek Studies 16117
(forthcoming) .
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that deserve a more prominent place in scholarship on RussoOttoman relations in general and on the religious dimension of tsarist
policy in particular. 2 Russian scholars in the Soviet era certainly utilized AVPRI's treasure trove for their important works on Russian
activities in the Balkans, Greece, and the wider Ottoman world. 3
Yet they generally downplayed or neglectetl the religious element in
tsarist ties with the Greek or Orthodox East, the term often used for
the Eastern Orthodox lands and peoples under Ottoman rule that
were formerly part of the Byzantine Empire. The most promising
development to fill this gap, and symptomatic of Russia's recovery
of religious identity, is the recent publication of two volumes of
AVPRI materials on Russia's diplomatic, economic, religious, and
cultural presence in the holy land during the late Imperial period. 4
2 Ministerstvo inostrannykh de! SSSR, Vneshniaia politika Rossii XIX i nachala XX v.:
Dokumenry Rossiiskogo ministerstva inostrannykh de!, 16 vols. (Moscow: Nauka, 19601995), hereafter cited as VPR, with published documents on Russo-Ottoman border
disputes, treaty agreements, trade, shipping, and consular affairs.
3 Examples of Soviet scholarship based on A VPRI materials include Avgusta M.
Stanislavskaia, Russko-angliiskie otnosheniia i problemy Sredizemnomor'ia (1798-1807)
(Moscow: Nauka, 1962), idem, Rossiia i Gretsiia v kontse XVIIl-nachale XIX v.: Politika
Rossii v lonicheskoi respublike, 1798-1807gg. (Moscow: Nauka, 1976); Grigorii L. Arsh,

Eteristskoe dvizhenie v Rossii. Osvoboditel'naia bor'ba grecheskogo naroda v nachale XIX v. i
russko-grecheskie sviazi (Moscow: Nauka, 1970), idem, l Kapodistriia i grecheskoe
natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie, 1809-1822 gg. (Moscow: Nauka, 1976);
Anatolii V. Fadeev, Rossiia i vostochnyi krizis 20-kh godov XIX veka (Moscow: Nauka,
1958); and Vitalii I. Sheremet, Turtsiia i Adrianopol'skii mir 1829 goda: iz istorii
vostochnogo voprosa (Moscow: Nauka, 1975). Additional works, by Georgiev and
Dostian, are cited below.
4 N . N . Lisovoi, ed., Rossiia v Sviatoi Zemle. Dokumenry i materialy, 2 vols. (Moscow:
Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2000), with an introduction to Russian activity in
Palestine by editor Lisovoi, 1: 12-17. The vast majority of these records describes the
endeavors of the Russian consulate-general in Jerusalem ( 1858-1914), the Palestine
Commission in the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry ( 1864-69), the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society ( 1882-1918), and the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in
Jerusalem (1847-1918). Useful earlier studies, though they did not draw on AVPRI
sources, are Theofanis G . Stavrou, Russian Interests in Palestine: A Study ofReligious and
Educational Enterprise (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1963); Derek Hopwood, The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine, 184~1914: Church and Politics in the
Near East (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969); and Stephen K. Batalden and Michael D .
Palma, "Orthodox Pilgrimage and Russian Landholding in Jerusalem: The British Colonial Record," in Stephen K. Batalden, ed., Seeking God· The Recovery ofReligious Iden-
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This collection of documents should serve as a model and a prompt
for the publication of additional AVPRI holdings on Russian activities in the Ottoman Empire and the Orthodox East, and the
enlarged resource base will no doubt facilitate research on all
aspects of tsarist policy.
A common Orthodox faith and a shared Byzantine civilization
opened various avenues of religious contact and interaction
between Muscovy and the Ottoman-ruled Orthodox East in the
16th and 17th centuries. Inspired partly by the Third Rome
theory, Moscow's tsars and church hierarchs distributed alms and
other forms of assistance to the patriarchates of Constantinople,
Alexandria, Jerusalem, and Antioch; to Greek clergy and monks
who traveled to Muscovy; and to custodians of the sacred places of
Mount Athas, Mount Sinai, and Jerusalem. From Muscovy a
steady stream of pilgrims, clergymen, and monks journeyed to
Orthodox shrines and monasteries in the Near East, often returning home with Byzantine religious artifacts and manuscripts.
Greek educators, translators, and churchmen who migrated to
Muscovy brought with them elements of Greek learning and scholarship, which helped fuel the reform efforts of Patriarch Nikon to
purify Russian church texts and rituals. Orthodox brotherhoods in
Nezhin and Lvov, funded partially by Muscovite, Greek, and
Balkan merchants, founded schools and churches to defend
Orthodoxy against Roman Catholicism in the embattled Ukraine.
Such were the most salient features of Moscow's religious link to
the Orthodox East before the Imperial era. 5
tity in Orthodox Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University
Press, 1993), 251---63.
5 For an introduction to the extensive literature on these religious ties, see Boris L.
Fonkich, Grechesko-russkie kultur 'nye sviazi v XV-XVII vv.: Grecheskie rukopisi v
Rossii (Moscow: Nauka, 1977); idem, "Russia and the Christian East from the Sixteenth to the First Quarter of the Eighteenth Century," Modem Greek Studies Yearbook
7 (1991): 439---61; Nikolai F. Kapterev, Kharakter otnoshenii Rossii k pravoslavnomu
vostoku v XVI i XVII stoletiiakh (Sergiev Posad: Izdanie knizhnogo magazina M. S.
Elova, 2nd ed., 1914); idem, Snosheniia ierusalimskogo patriarkha Dosiftia s russkim
pravitel'stvom (1669-1701) (Moscow: TipografiiaA. I. Snegirevoi, 1891). On Russian
travelers to the Greek East, many of whom recorded their impressions and observations
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Religion continued to figure prominently in Russia's relations
with the Near East during the 18th and 19th centuries, when Russian interests formed part of the larger European rivalry known as
the Eastern Question. Beginning in the reign of Catherine the
Great, the question of great power expansion and penetration at
the expense of the Ottoman Empire became a complex and multifaceted issue for Russia, as the pursuit of military, commercial, and
diplomatic aims combined with the defense of Eastern Orthodoxy.
The landmark Treaty ofKutchuk-Kainardji (1774) granted Russia
not just unrestricted trade access to the Black Sea and the Levant
and consular representation throughout the Ottoman Empire but
explicit rights of interceding for the sultan's Orthodox subjects who
resided in Moldavia and Wallachia. Additionally, Article Seven
articulated the Porte's promise to "protect constantly the Christian
religion and its churches" in the Ottoman realm, while Article
Fourteen permitted Russia's diplomatic mission in Istanbul to
build an Orthodox church in the Galata quarter, the enclave of
European embassies and residences, and to safeguard the clergy
and caretakers of this one particular church. 6
The Kutchuk-Kainardji Treaty not only widened the parameters
of tsarist endeavors in the Near East but often concealed Russian
of holy shrines, see Theofanis G . Stavrou and Peter R. Weisensel, Russian Travekrs to the
Christian Eastfrom the Twelfth to the Twentieth Centuries (Columbus, Oh.: Slavica Publishers, 1986), and K. Urguzova et al. , eds., Sviatye mesta vblizi i iuiali: Putevye zametki
russkikh pisateki I poloviny XIX veka (Moscow: Vostochnaia literatura, RAN and
Shkola-Press, 1995).
6 An English translation of the treaty appears in Jacob C. Hurewirz, ed., The Middk East

and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record Volume 1: European Bcpansion, 1535-1914 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2nd ed., 1975), 92-101. Also see
Roderic Davison, "'Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility': The Treaty of Kuchuk
Kainardji Reconsidered," in Roderic Davison, ed., Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774--1923: The Impact ofthe West (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), 2950; and Elena I. Druzhinina, Kiuchuk-Kainardzhiiskii mir 1774 goda: ego podgotovka i
zakliuchenie (Moscow: Nauka, 1955). On the broader import of the treaty for the Eastern Question, see Matthew S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774--1923: A Study in
International Relatiom (London: Macmillan, 1966), and Vladimir A. Georgiev, et al.,
Vostochnyi vopros vo vneshnei politike Rossii: konets XV!ll-nachak XX v. (Moscow:
Nauka, 1978).
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interests under the guise of "religious protection." Controversy
erupted almost immediately over the interpretation of Articles
Seven and Fourteen, a debate prompted by the allegedly vague or
ambiguous wording in these two religious clauses. As Roderic
Davison contends in his meticulously crafted research, however,
the phrasing in both articles expressed unequivocally clear and precise terms. The treaty confined Russia's right to mediate on behalf
of Ottoman Orthodox Christians to two specific areas: the
Danubian Principalities and the newly sanctioned Russian church
in the Galata district oflstanbul. Everywhere else within its dominion the Sublime Porte remained the rightful protector of Orthodox
Christian worship, churches, and clergy. Yet a manifesto of
Catherine II in 1775 spoke of advantages Russia had secured for
Christians throughout the Ottoman Empire and put forth the general notion that Russia had a right to protect all Orthodox subjects
from oppression. 7 Many of Russia's rulers, diplomats, officials, and
writers, as well as most segments of the public, clungl to this elastically
defined meaning of the two clauses. By doing so, they perpetuated the
widely held but spurious idea that the treaty gave Russia an ill-defined
prerogative to intercede for all of the sultan's Orthodox Christians.
The assertion of a comprehensive protectorship evinces the
amalgam of religion and politics that characterized Imperial Russia's Eastern strategy. Orthodoxy constituted an integral component of the ideology of autocracy, elevating tsars to divine-right
stature and underscoring their duty to defend Orthodox Christians both at home and abroad. More generally, religion permeated
the monarchical moral code which compelled tsars to uphold treaties, even misinterpreted ones, as sacred obligations. Autocracy's
sweeping claims of guardianship also built on a tradition of Russia's
close religious and cultural bonds with Orthodox brethren in the
Greek East, a connection that endured during the Ottoman era.
Moreover, Islam's general tolerance of Christianity and the Ottoman Empire's theocratic structure, which divided the sultan's sub7 Davison, '"Russian Skill and T urk.ish Imbecility': The Treaty ofKuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered," 37.
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jects into millets (nations) based on religion, enabled Orthodox Christians to preserve their identity and to look upon Russia as their
coreligionist patron and bulwark. 8 Greeks, Serbs, Bulgars,
Romanians, and other Orthodox Christians, historically tethered to
Russia by a common faith and Byzantine culture, solicited tsarist
financial, educational, diplomatic, and mjlitary support to deliver
their homelands (both real and imagined) from Ottoman hegemony
in the 19th and early 20th centuries. 9
Russia's pronouncements that treaties morally and legally bound
her to intervene in Ottoman affairs on behalf of Orthodoxy served
as a convenient rationale and pretext for the quest of tangible strategic aims, such as security along the porous Russo-Ottoman frontier, diplomatic leverage in the Balkans, and commercial gain in the
Black Sea and the Levant. Ambitious schemes like Catherine the
Great's unfulfilled Greek Project, calling for her appropriately
named grandson Konstantin to govern a revived Greek kingdom
from Constantinople, manifest the intersection of religious and
political designs in Russian approaches to the Eastern Question. 10
While the regime never precisely defined the exact nature or form
of Russia's sponsorship of Ottoman Orthodox Christians, this support included the disbursement of alms and material aid to
8 Richard Clogg, "The Greek Millet in the Ottoman Empire," in Benjamin Braude and
Bernard Lewis, eds., Christiam and fews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning ofa
Plural Society, 2 vols. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982), 1: 185-202. This two-volume work contains additional essays on the Ottoman millet system.
9 Barbara Jelavich has written extensively on various facets of the strained relationship between tsarist Russia and Balkan national movements in the 19th century: Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914 (New York: Cambridge U niversicy Press, 1991), Russia
and the Fonnation ofthe Romanian National State, 1821-1878 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1984), Russia and the Greek Revolution of 1843 (Munich: R.
Oldenbourg Verlag, 1966), and Russia and Greece during the Regency ofKing Othon,
1832-1835: Russian Documents on the First Years ofGreek Independence (Thessaloniki:
Institute for Balkan Studies, 1962).
IO On the Greek Project, see Hugh Ragsdale, "Russian Projects of Conquest in the Eighteenth Century," in Hugh Ragsdale, ed., Imperial Russian Foreign Policy (Washington
D .C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1993), 82-102, and idem, "Evaluating the Traditions
of Russian Aggression: Catherine II and the Greek Project," Skwonic and East European
Review 66, no.I (1988): 91-117.
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churches, monasteries, patriarchal sees, and other sacred sites of the
Greek East. Russian patronage also encompassed diplomatic
appeals in defense of broadly interpreted, if not fabricated, treaty
rights. Of course, for the Sublime Porte, guardianship over a significant portion of its subjects proclaimed by any foreign power, let
alone a traditional and mighty foe in territ9rial proximity, posed a
direct political challenge.
Alexander I hardly rejected or diminished the importance of
Russia's presumed religious rights as a factor in shaping Eastern
policy, as seen in the Russo-Turkish War of 1806-12, a conflict
mainly provoked by disagreements over the status of Moldavia and
Wallachia. 11 Nevertheless, the tsar adopted a seemingly moderate
and prudent course in Near Eastern affairs after the epic clash with
Napoleon and the Congress ofVienna peace settlement. The Concert of Europe, a system of conference diplomacy devised to ensure
great power consensus, sought to resolve contested issues, uphold
the balance of power, and preserve the political and territorial
status quo in Europe. Moreover, the tsar hoped to fortify the Concert's cooperative spirit with his concept of an ecumenical Holy
Alliance, a league or fellowship of Christian states founded upon
the precepts of monarchical solidarity, fraternal peace, and Christian brotherhood.
In line with these principles of moderation and accord, the tsar
and his joint foreign ministers (Karl V. Nessel'rode and loannis A.
Kapodistrias) took a cautious and conciliatory approach in official
affairs with the Ottoman government. 12 On several occasions in
1816, they instructed Russia's new envoy in Istanbul, Grigorii A.
Stroganov, to cultivate cordial ties with the Porte; to refrain from
11 On the Russo-Turkish Warofl806--12, see Irina S. Dostian, Rossiia i balkanskii vopros
(Moscow: Nauka, 1972), 42-79, and Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 1-24.
12 On the views and careers of Kapodistrias and Nessel' rode during their stints as foreign
ministers in the Alexandrine era, see Patricia Grimsted, The Foreign Ministers ofAlexander l- Political Attitudes and the Conduct ofRussian Dipwmacy, 1801-1825 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1969), 194-286, and Harold N . lngle, Nesselrodeand the
Russian Rapprochement with Britain, 1836-1844 (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1976), 1-26.
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threats when negotiating disputed points regarding Moldavia,
Wallachia, Serbia, and Black Sea merchant shipping; and to
comply with provisions of existing treaties. Above all, the ambassador had to act with restraint, patience, and forbearance in all of his
discussions with Ottoman officials and European envoys about
Russian interests in the region. 13
As for the specific matter of Turkey's Orthodox Christians, the
ambassador had to assure the Porte that Russia's intercession was
neither incompatible with the stability of the Ottoman Empire nor
harmful to the concerns of other European powers. The Foreign
Ministry exhorted Stroganov to demonstrate, through his words
and deeds, that Russia sought friendly relations founded upon genuine trust, shared principles, and identical interests. 14 For instance,
the tsar rejected the misguided assumption that Christian subjects
could actually better their lot through acts of rebellion against their
legitimate sovereign. Instead, the emperor hoped that the Porte,
without resorting to force of arms, religious abuse, or administrative
misrule, could find ways to remove cause for discord among Ottoman Christians and thus make them loyal and obedient subjects.
Furthermore, according to the same directive from the Foreign
Ministry, Alexander I had no plans or intent to undertake hostile
actions against the Ottoman government; on the contrary, the tsar
anticipated that changes in Ottoman treatment of Christian subjects would in fact strengthen the cohesion and stability of the
Ottoman Empire. If aggressive designs, bent on exploiting Ottoman weakness, actually guided Russia's policy, the tsar would not
attempt to allay Ottoman fears or to eliminate sources of friction
within the sultan's realm. He would simply allow disagreements
and problems between the two neighboring states to fester, thereby
increasing the likelihood of war. Instead, Alexander I wanted to
preserve the peace with Turkey, and for this end placed his trust in
the wisdom of the Ottoman government.
13 vPR9 (1974): 168-76, 207-12, 704---07. On tsarist policy in the Balkans and the Near
East after the Congress of Vienna, see Jelavich, Balkan Entanglements, 24-41, and
Dostian, Rossiia i ba!kamkii vopros, 129-95.
14 vPR9 (1974): 170, 172, 174-76.
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Such is the general spirit and tone of the document presented
here, Foreign Minister Nessel'rode's instruction of June 1816 to
envoy Stroganov on the topic of Russia's attitude toward Ottoman
Orthodox subjects, or "Christians of the East." 15 The tsar's stance,
motivated by the "immutable principles" of moderation, consensus, and reciprocity, underscored the importance of three factors:
previous treaty agreements; Russia's "moral obligations"; and "the
genuine interests ofTurkey itself." By showing more respect for the
religious and civil rights of Orthodox Christians, the Porte would
win their allegiance and loyalty and thus reinforce the realm's internal security, order, and well-being. In accord with the tsar's position
and aims, Stroganov had to intercede amicably but repeatedly on
behalf of Russia's Orthodox coreligionists.
A second issue raised in the Nessel'rode communique concerns
the current status of the age-old and seemingly intractable "monks'
quarrel" over the major Christian battlegrounds of sacred memory.
This bitter dispute between Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic,
and other Christian sects dealt with Ottoman Jerusalem's holy
places, most notably the Church of the Resurrection, also called the
Church of the Holy Sepulcher, built over the tomb of Christ. By
the start of the 19th century, the sultan's government had awarded
preferential worship and custodial privileges to the Catholics and
the Orthodox, the two primary antagonists, but the latter had
assumed control over a larger portion of the Church of the Resurrection. After a fire in 1808 damaged the shrine's wooden dome,
Franciscan monks and Greek church officials competed to win
Ottoman permission for the right to repair the church, a pivotal
concession in view of an unwritten rule governing and indeed exacerbating the conflict: the Porte recognized as the "owner" of a particular holy spot any religious community that gained the sultan's
favor to restore, wash, or sweep that site. 16
Understandably, by virtue of Russia's Orthodox connection to
15 VPR9 (1974): 187-90.
16 For an introduction to the scholarly literature on the holy places' dispute, see T. V.
Nosenko, "Konflikt vokrug Sviacykh mest v lerusalime i politika Rossii (konets XVIIIXIX w.)," in Lisovoi, ed., Rossiia v Sviatoi Zemle. Dokumenty i materiafy, 2: 613-25;

340

ST VLADIMIR'S THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

the Greek East, including alms from state and church sources for
the upkeep of monasteries and holy places, Greek hierarchs turned
to their coreligionist advocate in St Petersburg. Another impetus
for soliciting tsarist help came from the Treaty of KutchukKainardji, not just the controversial religious protection clauses but
the Porte's pledge in Article Eight to allow free and unimpeded passage for Russian pilgrims who traveled to the holy sites. Patriarch
Polykarp of Jerusalem petitioned Alexander I, several government
ministers, and the Holy Synod for monetary assistance to defray
some of the actual reconstruction costs. Russian relief would also
reduce the debts of the holy city's patriarchal see, incurred when
hierarchs had to proffer tribute and gifts to Ottoman officials in
return for authorization to construct or renovate churches.
Though the Greeks' position as custodian of the Holy Sepulcher
improved as a result of their eventual restoration of Christianity's
paramount shrine, Roman Catholics and Armenian Christians
continued to press their own claims for worship and upkeep rights
in the Church of the Resurrection and at other sacred places. Thus,
in his appeals to Russian patrons, Patriarch Polykarp summoned
tsarist mediation to shield Orthodox believers from harassment
and interference by rival sects. 17
The renewed controversy over the Holy Sepulcher sparked the
attention and support of the tsar, as Nessel'rode asserts in his directive to Stroganov. Russian aid and donations for the Greek church
Amos Elon, Jerusalem: Battlegrounds ofMemory (New York: Kodansha America, Inc.,
1995); Thomas A. Idinopulos,jerusalem: A History ofthe Holiest City as Seen Through the
Struggles ofJews, Christiam, and Muslims (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, Inc., 1994); Francis E.

Peters,jerusalem: The Holy City in the Eyes ofChroniclers, Visitors, Pilgrims, and Prophets
from the Days ofAbraham to the Beginnings ofModem Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). On the Church of the Resurrection and its various chapels, alters,
and passageways commemorating the sites of Christ's crucifixion, burial, and resurrection, also see Charles Coiiasnon, The Church ofthe Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem (London:
Oxford University Press, 1974).
17 On Polykarp's appeals for Russian aid, see VPR9 (1974): 702-3, and Alexandre Popoff,
La question des lieux saints de Jerusalem dam la correspondance diplomatique Russe du XIX
siecle. 1 partie (1800-1850) (St Petersburg: Imprimerie Russo-Frarn;aise, 1910), 1-7.
The patriarch of Jerusalem resided in Istanbul; he was thus in close proximity to the
Russian embassy and channeled his aid requests through tsarist envoys.
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in Jerusalem included the tsar's grant of twenty-five thousand
rubles in banknotes, a sum placed at the disposal of the Foreign
Ministry and earmarked for the envoy's safe delivery to Patriarch
Polykarp. Stroganov also had to convince the Porte that Orthodox
Christians should be allowed to perform their rites of worship at all
the sacred places without any encumbrances or restrictions from
other denominations. Once again, the Foreign Ministry advised
the ambassador to press home this point on the basis of the underlining principles of tsarist Eastern strategy-moderation, concord,
goodwill-and to remind the Porte of the tangible benefits it stood
to gain. By guaranteeing the protection of Orthodox subjects, the
sultan's regime would have every right to expect gratitude from the
empire's largest single Christian community, a prospect that would
serve the interests of both justice and the Ottoman state.
Subsequent communiques to Stroganov from the Foreign Ministry continued to address the quandary over the holy places and to
suggest ways to settle the feud once and for all. 18 In a memorandum
of December 1818, Foreign Minister Kapodistrias informed the
envoy that Alexander I's abiding concern for the status of the Holy
Sepulcher was inspired by his feelings of Christian piety and brotherhood, his protection of Orthodoxy, and his duty toward the sizable numbers of Russian pilgrims who trekked to Jerusalem every
year. The tsarist perspective, according to the dispatch, called for
resolving the dispute through negotiation, reconciliation, and
coexistence. In talks with the French ambassador in Istanbul,
Stroganov should emphasize that newly acquired custodial privileges for Orthodox Christians at the Lord's Tomb by no means
excluded worship rights for other Christians. Indeed, the foreign
minister wrote, "the gifts of divine mercy, manifesting themselves
in the virtue of true piety, will hardly dry up if they extend to all
believers" who gather in the same church to venerate the exact same
site. Christian harmony required that Catholic and Orthodox
faithful share fully and equally the right to perform worship ser18 See Popoff, La question des lieux saints de Jerusalem dam la correspondance diplomatique

Russe, I 4- I 46.
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vices; and under no circumstances should any denomination seek
to exert exclusive control over the Holy Sepulcher, a notion that
was misguided as well as "incompatible with the spirit of peace and
meekness that must permeate all Christians." 19 Armenian Christians were to be treated fairly so that they would no longer have
grounds for complaint or try to usurp the prerogatives of other
believers. Finally, Russia's envoy had to use all means of persuasion
and influence to win support from Greek Orthodox hierarchs for
the anticipated settlement of this conflict over Christianity's central shrine.
The "monks' quarrel" went unresolved and remained a source of
friction between Russia and France on the eve of the Crimean War
in the 1850s. More broadly, Alexandrine policy toward the Porte
after the Congress of Vienna, predicated on the precepts of moderation, accord, and reciprocity, faced obstacles and dilemmas that
called into question the viability of this approach. How to uphold
Russia's alleged right to protect Orthodox subjects and how to
maintain cordial ties with the Porte invariably clashed during
Balkan unrest, such as the Greek Revolution of 1821, when Ottoman reprisals against Orthodox clergymen and shrines forced the
tsarist regime to walk a fine line between neutrality and intervention.20 This duality would be tested in subsequent crises and disputes related to the Eastern Question, with Russia often precariously poised between war against the Porte or restraint and
compromise for the sake of Europe's balance of power. The tension
between these choices would be all the more acute when the obligation to defend Orthodox Christians beckoned as an opportunity to
pursue strategic gains, albeit at the risk of great power hostility and
19 VPR IO (1976): 598---602, 829-30, 833-34.
Theophilus C. Prousis, Russian Society and the Greek Revolution (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994), 26-54; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 49-75;
and Dostian, Rossiia i balkanskii vopros, 196-237. For a political scientist's perspective,
see Matthew Rendall, "Russia, the Concert of Europe, and Greece, 1821-29: A Test of
Hypotheses about the Vienna System," Security Studies 9, no.4 (2000) : 52-90. On the
holy places' dispute and other factors that contributed to the Crimean War, see David
M . Goldfrank, The Origins ofthe Crimean War (New York: Longman, 1994).
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at the expense of human and material resources in Balkan wars that
often produced paltry dividends for Russia. 21
Examining AVPRI materials, both published and unpublished,
may not profoundly alter the main contours of our understanding
of tsarist Eastern policy. Yet new details will inevitably deepen our
knowledge, suggest new lines of inquiry, and remind scholars and
students alike of the multiple facets of Russian involvement in the
Eastern Question, including religion and philanthropy.

In preparing this document, I have relied on the published French
original and its Russian translation and aimed to render the work
into clear and idiomatic English without modifying its essential
spirit or meaning. Though I have made slight changes in sentence
structure, syntax, punctuation, and wording for the sake of fluidity,
I have generally remained faithful to the particulars of the document's style and perspective. My own emendations appear m
brackets, and I have added an occasional explanatory note.

''A Supplementary Instruction from Karl V. Nessel'rode
to Envoy Grigorii A. Stroganov in Constantinople,"
13/25 June 181622
The detailed instructions which the emperor deemed necessary to provide his envoy at the Ottoman Porte, informing
him of the immutable principles that His Imperial Majesty
firmly intends to follow in all of his relations with this bordering state, indicate clearly enough the general point of view required to examine the attitude of Russia toward the Christian
subjects of the Porte. 23
The right to protect them openly through active and
friendly intercession with the Turkish government rests on
21 Barbara Jelavich's Balkan Entanglements remains the best introduction to tsarist Russia's
complicated, and rarely rewarding, involvement in Balkan affairs.
22 VPR9 (1974): 187-90. In the 19th century, Russia marked time by the OldSryleJulian
calendar, which was twelve days behind the New Style Gregorian calendar used in the
West and adopted in Russia in 1918.
23 On this "general point ofview," see VPR9 (1974): 168-76 (cited above in note#l3).
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sufficiently solid grounds and on equally legitimate considerations. Such grounds can be found in the texts of the treaties
themselves and in the nature of our previous relations with
the Sublime Porte. 24 The specified considerations emanate
from the moral obligations assumed by Russia toward the
Christian peoples of the East and from ,the genuine interests
of Turkey itself.
Indeed, one cannot but recognize that the more the Turkish government undertakes to respect the civil rights and religious privileges of the Christians under its supreme authority,
the more reason it will have to expect their allegiance to their
native land through ties engendered by their well-being and
security. These principles constantly guided the policy of His
Imperial Majesty during the recent events that changed the
face of Europe, and their application with the support of his
most august allies produced quite favorable results during the
European settlement in general; 25 hence, His Imperial Majesty does not doubt that powers friendly to Russia and the
Porte will observe with satisfaction as [the envoy] insinuates
the very same precepts of [this] moderate policy to the Turkish government in a congenial way. The emperor thus cannot
retreat from this course in his empire's subsequent relations
with the Sublime Porte. Consequently, he urges his envoy,
Baron Stroganov, to devote the most assiduous attention to
that part of his entrusted mission that deals with protecting
Christians of the East and to display special interest in guaranteeing and restoring their legitimate rights, privileges, and
benefits. All these questions, in an essential way, pertain to
the concerns of religion [in general] and of the predominant
Christian denomination in Turkey [in particular].
The pressing and repeated appeals of the Jerusalem patriarch to the Most Holy Synod of the Russian church helped
draw the explicit attention of His Imperial Majesty to this
24 Subsequent Russo-Ottoman pacts, such as the TreacyofJassy (1792) and the Treacy of
Bucharest (1812), reaffirmed the Treacy of Kutchuk-Kainardji. For the texts of these
later agreements, see Hurewi cz, ed., The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics,

105-9, 193-97.
25 A reference to the Congress of Vienna peace settlement.
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subject. 26 Upon learning in great detail of the misfortunes
that have recently beset the cradle of Christianity, His Imperial Majesty reached the conclusion chat two basic reasons explain the onerous position in which the [Greek Orthodox]
church of Palestine finds itself:
1. lack of monetary resources, which could have alleviated
the burden of debts incurred during the reconstruction
of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher;
2. harassments and all sorts of impositions, by which the
adherents of other faiths strive to gain exclusive possession of the Church of the Resurrection and of [other]
holy places in the vicinity of Jerusalem.
To help remedy the first difficulty, apart from numerous
collections of donations which he auch~orized and deigned to
promote in his empire, His Imperial Majesty expressly instructs his envoy to transmit to the Jerusalem patriarch, as secretly as possible so as not to compromise chis ecclesiastic,
twenty-five thousand rubles in banknotes, a sum attached to
chis dispatch and placed at the disposal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 27
As for the second obstacle, arising from the intrigues and
arbitrary interference chat constantly imperil the church of
Jerusalem, His Imperial Majesty directs envoy Baron Stroganov to make chis issue the object of amicable and repeated
representations to the Sublime Porte. By conveying to the
Turkish government the satisfaction His Imperial Majesty
would feel if [the Porte] extended protection to the majority
of Ottoman Christian subjects during the observance of their
rites of divine worship in Jerusalem, [and] by comparing chis
system of protection to the relationships between the various
denominations that prevailed until the past decade, Baron
Stroganov will manage to convince the Ottoman ministry
that Russia's mediation stems from the most disinterested
motives, fully coinciding with the actual interests of the Sub26 A reference to Patriarch Polycarp's appeals, cited above in note #17.
2 7 Popoff, La question des lieux saints deJerusalem dam la correspondance diplomatique Russe,
7-8, quotes this exact figure, twenty-five thousand rubles in banknotes.
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lime Porte. As proof of chis truth, the envoy should make use
of the general principle sec forth above and apply it co the internal situation of the Ottoman Empire. For obviously, by
rendering just protection co Christians of the Orthodox faith,
the Porte gains from chis [action] the right to their gratitude
and [thus] advances its own interests. On the contrary, by allowing the unjust claims of outsiders and by assisting chem,
the Porte only brings harm to its true interests and security
and derives no benefit from a tolerance as objectionable co
raison d'etat as co justice.
The envoy of His Imperial Majesty should put forth these
reasons in the most favorable light, without neglecting at the
same time to give chem proper legal form, so chat Christians
of the Orthodox faith will obtain once and for all the privileges they have enjoyed from time immemorial in Jerusalem
and its environs.
Every time the opportunity arises for His Imperial Majesty's envoy co make an official or indirect appeal on this
point, he must cake care not to overlook the importance of
protecting individuals and of not jeopardizing the safety of
anyone who might provoke the suspicion of the Sublime
Porte.
The envoy muse pay heed co all questions of a similar nature relating co the [religious] or civil rights of Christians dispersed in the rest of Turkey. His Imperial Majesty relies
entirely on the zeal and good sense [of his envoy] in the endeavor co reconcile all viewpoints and co realize the aim of an
intervention as beneficial as it is legitimate.

